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Because the virtues of democracy are taken for granted, they are rarely fully enumerated and considered. Democracy is not an unalloyed good, so it is important not to overstate or misrepresent the benefits of democratization. Nevertheless, the spread of democracy has many important benefits. This section enumerates how the spread of democracy will improve the lives of the citizens of new democracies, contribute to international peace, and directly advance the national interests of the United States.

The United States should attempt to spread democracy because people generally live better lives under democratic governments. Compared to inhabitants of nondemocracies, citizens of democracies enjoy greater individual liberty, political stability, freedom from governmental violence, enhanced quality of life, and a much lower risk of suffering a famine. Skeptics will immediately ask: Why should the United States attempt to improve the lives of non-Americans?

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Shouldn't this country focus on its own problems and interests? There are at least three answers to these questions. First, as human beings, American should and do feel some obligation to improve the well-being of other human beings. The bonds of common humanity do not stop at the borders of the United States. In a world where the use of force remains possible, no government can afford to pursue a foreign policy based on altruism.

The human race is not about to embrace a cosmopolitan moral vision in which borders and national identities become irrelevant. But there are many possibilities for action motivated by concern for individuals in other countries. In the United States, continued public concern over human rights in other countries, as well as governmental and nongovernmental efforts to relieve hunger, poverty, and suffering overseas, suggest that Americans accept some bonds of common humanity and feel some obligations to foreigners.

The emergence of the so-called "CNN Effect"-the tendency for Americans to be aroused to action by television images of suffering people overseas-is further evidence that cosmopolitan ethical sentiments exist. If Americans care about improving the lives of the citizens of other countries, then the case for promoting democracy grows stronger to the extent that promoting democracy is an effective means to achieve this end.

Second, Americans have a particular interest in promoting the spread of liberty. The United States was founded on the principle of securing liberty for its citizens. Its founding documents and institutions all emphasize that liberty is a core value. Among the many observers and political scientists who make this point is Samuel Huntington, who argues that America's "identity as a nation is inseparable from its commitment to liberal and democratic values. Given its founding principles and very identity, the United States has a large stake in advancing its core value of liberty.

As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has argued: "The United States is uniquely and self-consciously a country founded on a set of ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere. The Founding Fathers declared that all were created equal-not just those in Britain's 13 American colonies-and that to secure the 'unalienable rights' of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, people had the right to establish governments that derive 'their just powers from the consent of the governed. Third, improvements in the lives of individuals in other countries matter to Americans because the United States cannot insulate itself from the world.


These trends give the United States a greater stake in the fate of other societies, because widespread misery abroad may create political turmoil, economic instability, refugee flows, and environmental damage that will affect Americans. As I argue below in my discussion of how promoting democracy serves U. The growing interconnectedness of international relations means that the United States also has an indirect stake in the well-being of those in other countries, because developments overseas can have unpredictable consequences for the United States. For these three reasons, at least, Americans should care about how the spread of democracy can improve the lives of people in other countries.

The first way in which the spread of democracy enhances the lives of those who live in democracies is by promoting individual liberty, including freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, and freedom to own private property. As Samuel Huntington has written, liberty is "the peculiar virtue of democracy. Moreover, governments that are accountable to the public are less likely to deprive their citizens of human rights.

The global spread of democracy is likely to bring greater individual liberty to more and more people. Even imperfect and illiberal democracies tend to offer more liberty than autocracies, and liberal democracies are very likely to promote liberty. Freedom House's survey of "Freedom in the World" found that 79 out of democracies could be classified as "free" and 39 were "partly free" and, of those, 29 qualified as "high partly free. The case for the maximum possible amount of individual freedom can be made on the basis of utilitarian calculations or in terms of natural rights.

The utilitarian case for increasing the amount of individual liberty rests on the belief that increased liberty will enable more people to realize their full human potential, which will benefit not only themselves but all of humankind. This view holds that greater liberty will allow the human spirit to flourish, thereby unleashing greater intellectual, artistic, and productive energies that will ultimately benefit all of humankind.

The rights-based case for liberty, on the other hand, does not focus on the consequences of increased liberty, but instead argues that all men and women, by virtue of their common humanity, have a right to freedom. This argument is most memorably expressed in the American Declaration of Independence: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness The virtues of greater individual liberty are not self-evident.

Various political ideologies argue against making liberty the paramount goal of any political system. Some do not deny that individual liberty is an important goal, but call for limiting it so that other goals may be achieved. Others place greater emphasis on obligations to the community. The British Fabian Socialist Sidney Webb, for example, articulated this view clearly: "The perfect and fitting development of each individual is not necessarily the utmost and highest cultivation of his own personality, but the filling, in the best possible way, of his humble function in the great social machine.

Particularly as socioeconomic development elevates societies above subsistence levels, individuals desire more choice and autonomy in their lives. More important, most political systems that have been founded on principles explicitly opposed to liberty have tended to devolve into tyrannies or to suffer economic, political, or social collapse. Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.

Rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal democracies-between and saw only 0. The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. Democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime.

There are two reasons for the relative absence of civil violence in democracies: 1 Democratic political systems-especially those of liberal democracies constrain the power of governments, reducing their ability to commit mass murders of their own populations. As Rummel concludes, "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely The more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects. If all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents.

A third reason for promoting democracy is that democracies tend to enjoy greater prosperity over long periods of time. As democracy spreads, more individuals are likely to enjoy greater economic benefits. Democracy does not necessarily usher in prosperity, although some observers claim that "a close correlation with prosperity" is one of the "overwhelming advantages" of democracy. Others are among the most prosperous societies on earth.

Nevertheless, over the long haul democracies generally prosper. As Mancur Olson points out: "It is no accident that the countries that have reached the highest level of economic performance across generations are all stable democracies. Authoritarian regimes often compile impressive short-run economic records. But autocratic countries rarely can sustain these rates of growth for long.

As Mancur Olson notes, "experience shows that relatively poor countries can grow extraordinarily rapidly when they have a strong dictator who happens to have unusually good economic policies, such growth lasts only for the ruling span of one or two dictators. Most experts doubt that China will continue its rapid economic expansion. Economist Jagdish Bhagwati argues that "no one can maintain these growth rates in the long term. Sooner or later China will have to rejoin the human race.

Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are particularly persuasive explanations. First, democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over the long run.

Most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity.

It has found that countries classified as "free" had annual real per capita Gross Domestic Product GDP expressed in terms of purchasing power parities growth rates of 2. In "mostly free" countries the rate was 0. Second, democracies that embrace liberal principles of government are likely to create a stable foundation for long-term economic growth. Individuals will only make long-term investments when they are confident that their investments will not be expropriated. These and other economic decisions require assurances that private property will be respected and that contracts will be enforced.

These conditions are likely to be met when an impartial court system exists and can require individuals to enforce contracts. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has argued that: "The guiding mechanism of a free market economy Mancur Olson thus points out that "the conditions that are needed to have the individual rights needed for maximum economic development are exactly the same conditions that are needed to have a lasting democracy. A third reason may operate in some circumstances: democratic governments are more likely to have the political legitimacy necessary to embark on difficult and painful economic reforms.

Fourth, the United States should spread democracy because the citizens of democracies do not suffer from famines. The economist Amartya Sen concludes that "one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press.

Although this claim has been most closely identified with Sen, other scholars who have studied famines and hunger reach similar conclusions. Joseph Collins, for example, argues that: "Wherever political rights for all citizens truly flourish, people will see to it that, in due course, they share in control over economic resources vital to their survival. Lasting food security thus requires real and sustained democracy.

Throughout history, famines have occurred in many different types of countries, but never in a democracy. Democracies do not experience famines for two reasons. First, in democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their leaders have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. The need to be reelected impels politicians to ensure that their people do not starve.

As Sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political solidarity. Moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers often have political incentives to use famine as a means of exterminating their domestic opponents. Second, the existence of a free press and the free flow of information in democracies prevents famine by serving as an early warning system on the effects of natural catastrophes such as floods and droughts that may cause food scarcities.

A free press that criticizes government policies also can publicize the true level of food stocks and reveal problems of distribution that might cause famines even when food is plentiful. During the famine in China that killed million people, the Chinese authorities overestimated the country's grain reserves by million metric tons. This disaster later led Mao Zedong to concede that "Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below. The food supply was high, but floods, unemployment, and panic made it harder for those in need to obtain food. The two factors that prevent famines in democracies-electoral incentives and the free flow of information-are likely to be present even in democracies that do not have a liberal political culture.

These factors exist when leaders face periodic elections and when the press is free to report information that might embarrass the government. A full-fledged liberal democracy with guarantees of civil liberties, a relatively free economic market, and an independent judiciary might be even less likely to suffer famines, but it appears that the rudiments of electoral democracy will suffice to prevent famines. The ability of democracies to avoid famines cannot be attributed to any tendency of democracies to fare better economically.

Poor democracies as well as rich ones have not had famines. India, Botswana, and Zimbabwe have avoided famines, even when they have suffered large crop shortfalls. In fact, the evidence suggests that democracies can avoid famines in the face of large crop failures, whereas nondemocracies plunge into famine after smaller shortfalls. Sudan and Ethiopia, which were nondemocracies, suffered major famines, whereas the democracies of Botswana and Zimbabwe did not.

But the absence of famines in new, poor democracies suggests that democratic governance itself is sufficient to prevent famines. The case of India before and after independence provides further evidence that democratic rule is a key factor in preventing famines. Prior to independence in , India suffered frequent famines. Shortly before India became independent, the Bengal famine of killed million people.

Since India became independent and democratic, the country has suffered severe crop failures and food shortages in , , , and , but it has never suffered a famine. In addition to improving the lives of individual citizens in new democracies, the spread of democracy will benefit the international system by reducing the likelihood of war. Democracies do not wage war on other democracies. This absence-or near absence, depending on the definitions of "war" and "democracy" used-has been called "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations.

Although wars between democracies and nondemocracies would persist in the short run, in the long run an international system composed of democracies would be a peaceful world. At the very least, adding to the number of democracies would gradually enlarge the democratic "zone of peace. Many studies have found that there are virtually no historical cases of democracies going to war with one another. In an important two-part article published in , Michael Doyle compares all international wars between and and a list of liberal states.

Most studies of the democratic-peace proposition have argued that democracies only enjoy a state of peace with other democracies; they are just as likely as other states to go to war with nondemocracies. Two types of explanations have been offered for the absence of wars between democracies. The first argues that shared norms prevent democracies from fighting one another.

The second claims that institutional or structural constraints make it difficult or impossible for a democracy to wage war on another democracy. The normative explanation of the democratic peace argues that norms that democracies share preclude wars between democracies. One version of this argument contends that liberal states do not fight other liberal states because to do so would be to violate the principles of liberalism. Liberal states only wage war when it advances the liberal ends of increased individual freedom. A liberal state cannot advance liberal ends by fighting another liberal state, because that state already upholds the principles of liberalism.

In other words, democracies do not fight because liberal ideology provides no justification for wars between liberal democracies. This norm applies between and within democratic states. Democracies resolve their domestic conflicts without violence, and they expect that other democracies will resolve inter-democratic international disputes peacefully.

At the most general level, democratic leaders are constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to mobilize for war. In most democracies, the legislative and executive branches check the war-making power of each other. These constraints may prevent democracies from launching wars. When two democracies confront one another internationally, they are not likely to rush into war. Their leaders will have more time to resolve disputes peacefully.

For example, in liberal democracies liberal norms and democratic processes probably work in tandem to synergistically produce the democratic peace. They thus will have few crises and wars. In illiberal or semiliberal democracies, norms play a lesser role and crises are more likely, but democratic institutions and processes may still make wars between illiberal democracies rare.

Finally, state-level factors like norms and domestic structures may interact with international-systemic factors to prevent wars between democracies. If democracies are better at information-processing, they may be better than nondemocracies at recognizing international situations where war would be foolish.

Thus the logic of the democratic peace may explain why democracies sometimes behave according to realist systemic predictions. The United States will have an interest in promoting democracy because further democratization enhances the lives of citizens of other countries and contributes to a more peaceful international system. To the extent that Americans care about citizens of other countries and international peace, they will see benefits from the continued spread of democracy.

Spreading democracy also will directly advance the national interests of the United States, because democracies will not launch wars or terrorist attacks against the United States, will not produce refugees seeking asylum in the United States, and will tend to ally with the United States. First, democracies will not go to war against the United States, provided, of course, that the United States remains a democracy.

The logic of the democratic peace suggests that the United States will have fewer enemies in a world of more democracies. If democracies virtually never go to war with one another, no democracy will wage war against the United States. Democracies are unlikely to get into crises or militarized disputes with the United States. Promoting democracy may usher in a more peaceful world; it also will enhance the national security of the United States by eliminating potential military threats. The United States would be more secure if Russia, China, and at least some countries in the Arab and Islamic worlds became stable democracies.

Second, spreading democracy is likely to enhance U. The world's principal sponsors of international terrorism are harsh, authoritarian regimes, including Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Sudan. Some skeptics of the democratic-peace proposition point out that democracies sometimes have sponsored covert action or "state terrorism" against other democracies. Examples include U. In each case, the target state had dubious democratic credentials.

And the perpetrator of the alleged "state terrorist" acts in each case was the United States itself, which suggests that the United States has little to fear from other democracies. Third, the spread of democracy will serve American interests by reducing the number of refugees who flee to the United States. The countries that generate the most refugees are usually the least democratic. The absence of democracy tends to lead to internal conflicts, ethnic strife, political oppression, and rapid population growth-all of which encourage the flight of refugees.

The results of the U. The number of refugees attempting to flee Haiti for the United States dropped dramatically after U. In addition to reducing the number of countries that generate refugees, the spread of democracy is likely to increase the number of countries that accept refugees, thereby reducing the number of refugees who will attempt to enter the United States. Fourth, the global spread of democracy will advance American interests by creating more potential allies for the United States. Historically, most of America's allies have been democracies. In general, democracies are much more likely to ally with one another than with nondemocracies.

Fifth, the spread of democracy internationally is likely to increase Americans' psychological sense of well-being about their own democratic institutions.

Part of the impetus behind American attempts to spread democracy has always come from the belief that American democracy will be healthier when other countries adopt similar political systems. To some extent, this belief reflects the conviction that democracies will be friendly toward the United States. But it also reflects the fact that democratic principles are an integral part of America's national identity. The United States thus has a special interest in seeing its ideals spread. Finally, the United States will benefit from the spread of democracy because democracies will make better economic partners.

Democracies are more likely to adopt market economies, so democracies will tend to have more prosperous and open economies. The United States generally will be able to establish mutually beneficial trading relationships with democracies.

Cultural Differences Between Modern Day North And South

And democracies provide better climates for American overseas investment, by virtue of their political stability and market economies. Although many political scientists accept the proposition that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another, several critics have challenged claims of a democratic peace. By the late s, proponents and critics of the democratic peace were engaged in a vigorous and sometimes heated debate. Critics have presented several important challenges to the deductive logic and empirical bases of the democratic peace proposition.

They have argued that there is not a convincing theoretical explanation of the apparent absence of war between democracies, that democracies actually have fought one another, that the absence of wars between democracies is not statistically significant, and that factors other than shared democratic institutions or values have caused the democratic peace.

The critics of the democratic peace have presented vigorous arguments that have forced the proposition's proponents to refine and qualify the case for the democratic peace. These criticisms do not, however, refute the principal arguments for the democratic peace. As I argue below, there is still a compelling deductive and empirical case that democracies are extremely unlikely to fight one another.

Moreover, the case for spreading democracy does not rest entirely on the democratic-peace proposition. Although those who favor promoting democracy often invoke the democratic peace, the debate over whether the United States should spread democracy is not the same as the debate over the democratic peace. Even if the critics were able to undermine the democratic-peace proposition, their arguments would not negate the case for spreading democracy, because there are other reasons for promoting democracy.

More important, the case for promoting democracy as a means of building peace remains sound if the spread of democracy merely reduces the probability of war between democracies, whereas "proving" the democratic peace proposition requires showing that the probability of such wars is at or close to zero. Several criticisms of the democratic peace proposition fault the logic that has been advanced to explain the apparent absence of war between democracies. These arguments do not rest on an assessment of the empirical evidence, but instead rely on analyses and critiques of the internal consistency and persuasiveness of the theoretical explanations of the democratic peace.

Critics have offered four major challenges to the logic of the democratic peace: a there is no consensus on the causal mechanisms that keep democracies at peace: b the possibility that democracies may turn into nondemocracies means that even democracies operate according to realist principles; c the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace is flawed, not least because its logic also would predict that democracies are less likely to be involved in any wars, not just wars with other democracies; and d the normative explanation of the democratic peace is unpersuasive.

The Argument: The first, and most general criticism of the deductive logic of the democratic peace proposition holds that the lack of agreement on what causes democracies to avoid war with one another calls the proposition into question. Response: The fact that several theories have been advanced to explain the democratic peace does not mean that we cannot be confident that democracies are unlikely to fight one another.

There is no reason to assume that a single theory explains all the cases in which democracies have avoided war with one another. It is possible to be confident in an empirical finding even when many different explanations account for it. For example, it is empirically true that all human beings eventually die. The discovery of evidence to refute this proposition would have profound biological, philosophical, and theological implications, not to mention its effects on retirement planning and the future of the Social Security system.

But there are many causes of death, each of which rests on a different logic of explanation. People die in wars, accidents, and violent crimes, as well as from AIDS, heart disease, numerous types of cancer, and Alzheimer's Disease, among many other factors.

In some cases, the causal logic of the explanation of death is very clear. It is well understood how a bullet through the heart leads to death.

Cultures, Subcultures, and Countercultures: Crash Course Sociology #11

In other cases, including many infectious and chronic diseases, the precise biological and physiological processes that cause death are not fully understood. Nevertheless, the variety of causal mechanisms and our incomplete understanding of many of them do not lead us to the conclusion that some human beings will not die. Accounting for the absence of wars between democracies is somewhat similar to explaining why people die. Several causal mechanisms explain the absence of wars between democracies. In some cases, democracies avoid war because the distribution of power in the international system gives them strong incentives to remain at peace.

In at least some of these cases, democratic decision-making processes may make democracies "smarter" and better able to recognize systemic incentives. When states share liberal values, they are unlikely to go to war because fighting one another would undermine liberal values such as respect for individual freedom. As John Owen has argued, democratic institutions may reinforce the incentives for peace provided by shared liberal principles. Proponents of the democratic peace need to refine the logic of each explanation and identify the conditions under which they apply, but the multiplicity of explanations does not mean that the democratic peace is invalid.

The Argument: A second criticism of the logic of the democratic peace argues that democracies cannot enjoy a perpetual peace among themselves because there is always a possibility that a democratic state will become nondemocratic. This possibility means that even democracies must be concerned about the potential threat posed by other democracies. John Mearsheimer argues that: "Liberal democracies must therefore worry about relative power among themselves, which is tantamount to saying that each has an incentive to consider aggression against the other to forestall future trouble.

Response: There are four reasons for rejecting claims that fears of democratic backsliding compel democracies to treat other democracies as they would treat any nondemocratic state. First, the historical record shows that mature, stable democracies rarely become autocracies. Second, democracies are able to recognize and respond to states that are making a transition from democracy to authoritarianism. Democratic states thus can pursue a policy of accommodation toward other democracies, hedge their bets with more cautious policies toward unstable or uncertain democracies, and abandon accommodation when democracies turn into nondemocracies.

There is no reason to assume that democracies will become autocracies overnight and then immediately launch attacks on democracies. Third, like some other realist arguments, the claim that states must give priority to preparing for an unlikely dangerous future development rests on flawed logic. It assumes that states must base their foreign policies almost entirely on worst-case scenarios.

Similar logic would imply that, for example, citizens in any country should act on the basis of the assumption that domestic law and order might collapse into anarchy and violence. Fourth, the claim that democracies must worry about the relative power of other democracies which may become autocracies relies on the same shaky logic that predicts that states cannot cooperate because they need to worry about the relative gains achieved by other states. The relative-gains argument holds that in international politics, cooperation is rare because it often gives greater gains to one state, and these relative disparities in gains can be turned into advantages in power than can be used to threaten the state that gains less.

In practice, however, relative-gains concerns vary and are often almost nonexistent. The Argument: Critics of the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace make the following arguments. First, the structural-institutional model fails to explain why democracies go to war with nondemocracies, even though they do not fight other democracies.

If leaders of democracies are constrained from going to war by the public, this constraint would also prevent democracies from fighting nondemocracies. Second, critics argue that the public is often just as warlike as the leaders that they are supposed to constrain.

Public jingoism and enthusiasm for war accompanied the outbreak of World War One and helped cause the Spanish-American War. The structural-institutional model thus erroneously assumes that the people are usually more pacific than their leaders. The end of conscription in many countries and the tendency for wars to be fought by volunteer professional armies may further erode public opposition to the use of force. Response: The criticisms of the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace are not persuasive, for four reasons.

First, this explanation can account for why democracies only avoid wars with other democracies, because democracies may behave differently toward states i. Democracies may distinguish between states on the basis of their political institutions, and pursue different policies toward those that are constrained by democratic institutions. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman argue that "some political institutions help foster beliefs Democratic institutions are visible signs that the state in question is likely to face high political costs for using force in its diplomacy.

Thus the institutional argument does not actually predict that democracies will pursue peaceful policies toward all types of states. Second, the institutional-structural explanation, properly formulated, need not rest on the assumption that the public is peace-loving while leaders are eager to go to war. Some proponents of the democratic peace proposition, including Immanuel Kant, have assumed that the people are less eager to favor war, because they will ultimately be forced to pay its costs. In a democracy, the executive branch, legislative branch, and the public all constrain each other's ability to make rash and hasty decisions for war.

Third, the critics overlook how the existence of domestic constraints in a pair of democratic states can enable a democratic dyad to spend more time seeking a peaceful settlement of a conflict than a dyad with one or no democracies. If both states in a crisis are unable to mobilize quickly, they will have more time to resolve the crisis without war. Bruce Russett argues: "If another nation's leaders regard a state as democratic, they will anticipate a difficult and lengthy process before the democracy is likely to use significant military force against them. They will expect an opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement.

Finally, critics of the institutional-structural explanation have not addressed the claim that democratic institutions endow democracies with better information-processing capabilities that enable democracies to limit the myths that cause war and to avoid wars when international circumstances render war unwise. The Argument: Scholars skeptical of the democratic peace proposition have not criticized the normative explanation for the democratic peace as much as they have argued against the structural-institutional explanation.

Several skeptics have not attacked the logic of the normative explanation, preferring to argue against the democratic peace on empirical grounds. Some critics claim that democratic norms should preclude the use of threats or covert action by democracies against other democracies. Norms of trust and respect for the autonomy of liberal regimes would rule out such behavior, just as they proscribe war.

But democracies often have threatened war or engaged in covert actions against other democracies. Response: Proponents of the democratic peace counter that the involvement of the United States in Chile in is usually the only example of covert intervention by a democracy in another democracy and that democracies as a group are actually less likely to engage in covert or overt interventions.

If democracies or liberal states fail to recognize one another or temporarily adopt illiberal policies, they may find themselves at odds with other democracies or liberal states. But as crises develop between liberal democracies, they tend to act on the basis of their shared norms and draw back from the brink of war. The Argument: Critics of the democratic peace point to apparent wars between democracies as evidence that there is no democratic peace.

At least 17 conflicts have been cited as potential wars between democracies. Responses: There are three reasons to reject the claim that the democratic peace proposition is invalid because democracies may have fought some wars. First, the democratic peace propositionCcorrectly formulated-holds that democracies rarely fight, not that they never fight. Thus the correct formulation of the democratic peace proposition is the statement that democracies almost never go to war with one another.

Second, many of the cases cited do not qualify as "wars" between "democracies. In some cases, one of the participants was not a democracy. In , Britain was not a democracy. Spain's democratic credentials in were dubious. Germany in was not governed by liberal principles and its foreign policy was directed by the Kaiser, not the elected Reichstag. The American Civil War was not an international war. Finland engaged in virtually no direct hostilities with the Western allies during World War Two; it fought almost entirely against communist Russia. Third, the criticism that democracies have fought one another is irrelevant to deciding whether the United States should export democracy.

The spread of democracy makes sense as long as democracies are significantly less likely to go to war with one another. A policy of spreading democracy would be justified if democracies have, for example, avoided war The Argument: Statistical critiques of the evidence for the democratic peace proposition generally argue that there is not enough evidence to conclude that the absence of wars between democracies is statistically significant.

There are two underlying logics behind most of these quantitative arguments. The first suggests that wars between a given pair of states are relatively rare in international politics, so the absence of wars between democracies might be a coincidence.

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Responses: Many quantitative analyses conclude that challenges to the statistical significance of the democratic peace do not withstand close scrutiny. Maoz also argues that it is misleading to count all parties in large, multi-state wars as being at war with one another. He notes that Spiro changes the counting rule for the Korean War.

Maoz and Russett focused on the "politically-relevant" dyads, which account for most wars. Maoz also claims that slicing the data into one-year segments makes finding any war statistically insignificant. Such slicing is like testing whether a bowl of sugar will attract ants by assessing the statistical significance of finding an ant on an individual grain of sugar. The odds that ants will be in the sugar bowl are high; the chances of an ant being on a given grain of sugar, however, are so low that finding one on a grain would not be statistically significant.

When Maoz looks at politically-relevant dyads, he finds that one would expect And when Maoz adopts Spiro's suggestion to look at dyads over their entire history, he finds that conflict actually fell when both countries in a dyad became democratic. The second argument also is unpersuasive, because Farber and Gowa make an arbitrary decision to slice up the data into different periods and categories.

Moreover, Maoz is unable to replicate their results. Farber and Gowa appear to have miscounted the total number of dyads. An additional set of arguments suggests other factors besides shared democracy have caused democracies to remain at peace with one another. Such claims are implicit in some critiques of the logic and evidence, but not all such critiques identify the factors that are alleged to count for the absence of wars between democracies.

The Argument: Several critics of the democratic peace proposition claim that the absence of war among democracies can be explained by the fact that democracies often have allied against common threats. Democracies have avoided wars with one another not because they share democratic forms of government, but because they have had a common interest in defeating a common enemy.

Thus the realist logic of balancing against threats explains the democratic peace. Responses: There are three responses to the claim that allying against common threats is a more important cause of peace among democracies. First, those who make this argument overlook the fact that threat perceptions and alliance choice often reflect shared values and political principles. These critics assume that alliance formation proceeds in strict accordance with realist logic and that regime type plays no role.

Democracies, however, may have found themselves allied to one another against nondemocracies because they share a commitment to democratic values and want to defend them against threats from nondemocracies. Indeed, if the democratic peace proposition is only partially valid and if it is at least dimly understood by decisionmakers, democracies will find other democracies less threatening than nondemocracies and therefore will tend to align with them against nondemocracies.

This argument is consistent with Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory, which identifies offensive intentions as element of threat. Second, the tendency of democracies to ally with one another is further evidence of the special characteristics of democratic foreign policy. Instead of being a refutation of the democratic peace, the tendency of democracies to ally with one another is actually an additional piece of confirming evidence. Third, Maoz does an interesting test, examining whether states were allied before they became democracies or allied only after they became democracies.

He finds that "Non-aligned democracies are considerably less likely to fight each other than aligned non-democracies. The Argument: Some critics of the democratic peace proposition claim that democracies have not fought one another because they have not had the opportunity. Until recently, there were relatively few democracies in the international system. Many were geographically remote from each other. Response: The most sophisticated statistical analyses of the evidence for the democratic peace take these variables into account and still conclude that there is a strong relationship between democracy and peace.

The Argument: Skeptics suggest that, if the democratic peace proposition is valid, we should find that pairs of democracies behave in crises in way that reveals that shared democracy, not considerations of power and interest, caused them to avoid war. For example, tracing the process of how events unfolded should reveal that the publics in democracies did not want war with other democracies, that leaders did not make military threats against other democracies, and that democracies adopted accommodating behavior toward other democracies.

Response: Proponents of the democratic-peace proposition do not deny that considerations of power and interest often motivate states. Thus evidence that democracies are sensitive to power and interest does not refute the democratic-peace proposition.

In addition, critics of the democratic-peace proposition have not tested it fairly; they have not deduced the full range of predictions that the normative and institutional model makes about how democracies will avoid war. More comprehensive tests would also deduce and test hypotheses about how many political and diplomatic aspects of crises between democratic states differ from other crises.

Such tests would also compare pairs of democratic states to mixed and nondemocratic pairs. John Owen has conducted such tests and finds considerable evidence to support the democratic-peace proposition. The Argument: One of the most important arguments against U. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder make this argument and support it with statistical evidence that shows a correlation between democratization and war.

They suggest that several causal mechanisms explain why democratization tends to lead to war. First, old elites play the nationalist card in an effort to incite conflict so that they can retain power. Second, in emerging democracies without strong democratic institutions new rulers compete for support by playing the nationalist card and search for foreign scapegoats for failures.

The argument that democratization causes war does not directly challenge the usual form of the democratic peace proposition. Mansfield and Snyder recognize that "It is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. Responses: Mansfield and Snyder have advanced an important new argument, but even if partially true, it does not refute the case for spreading democracy internationally.

Promoting democracy makes more sense than this course, because the risks of democratization are not so high and uncontrollable that we should give up on attempts to spread democracy. First, there are reasons to doubt the strength of the relationship between democratization and war. Other quantitative studies challenge the statistical significance of Mansfield and Snyder's results, suggest that there is an even stronger connection between movements toward autocracy and the onset of war, find that it is actually unstable transitions and reversals of democratization that increase the probability of war, and argue that democratization diminishes the likelihood of militarized international disputes.

Mansfield and Snyder themselves point out that "reversals of democratization are nearly as risky as democratization itself," thereby bolstering the case for assisting the consolidation of new democracies. Of these countries, only Slovenia was involved in brief series of military skirmishes with Serbia. Countries such as Mongolia and South Africa appear to have made the transition to democracy without going to war.

The new democracies plagued by the most violence, including some former Soviet republics and the republics of the former Yugoslavia, are those that are the least democratic and may not qualify as democracies at all. All of this evidence suggests that whatever may have increased the war-proneness of democratizing states in the past may not be present in the contemporary international system. It may be that states making the transition from feudalism to democracy became more war-prone or that the emerging democracies of the 19th century were European great powers that embarked on imperial wars of conquest.

These factors will not lead today's new democracies into war. Finally, if the democratic peace proposition is correct, the higher proportion of democracies in the current international system may further reduce the risk that new democracies will not engage in war, because they will find themselves in a world of many democracies instead of one of many potentially hostile nondemocracies. Second, it is possible to control any risks of war posed by democratization.

Mansfield and Snyder identify several useful policies to mitigate any potential risks of democratization. Old elites that are threatened by democratization can be given "golden parachutes" that enable them to at least retain some of their wealth and to stay out of jail. The Arguments: One of the most prominent recent criticisms of attempts to promote democracy claims that democratic elections often have few positive effects, especially in countries that do not have liberal societies or other socioeconomic conditions such as a large middle class and a high level of economic development.

These arguments imply that electoral democracy may be undesirable in many countries and that the United States should not encourage its spread. Democratically elected governments may turn out to be illiberal regimes that oppress their citizens. And modernity in art "is more than merely the state of being modern, or the opposition between old and new" Smith In the essay "The Painter of Modern Life" , Charles Baudelaire gives a literary definition: "By modernity I mean the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent" Baudelaire , Advancing technological innovation, affecting artistic technique and the means of manufacture, changed rapidly the possibilities of art and its status in a rapidly changing society.

Photography challenged the place of the painter and painting. Architecture was transformed by the availability of steel for structures. From theologian Thomas C. Oden 's perspective, "modernity" is marked by "four fundamental values" Hall :. Modernity rejects anything "old" and makes "novelty Pope Pius X further elaborated on the characteristics and consequences of Modernism, from his perspective, in an encyclical entitled " Pascendi dominici gregis " Feeding the Lord's Flock on September 8, Pius X Pascendi Dominici Gregis states that the principles of Modernism, taken to a logical conclusion, lead to atheism.

The Roman Catholic Church was serious enough about the threat of Modernism that it required all Roman Catholic clergy, pastors, confessors, preachers, religious superiors and seminary professors to swear an Oath Against Modernism Pius X from until this directive was rescinded in Of the available conceptual definitions in sociology , modernity is "marked and defined by an obsession with ' evidence '," visual culture , and personal visibility Leppert , Generally, the large-scale social integration constituting modernity, involves [ citation needed ] the:.

But there does seem to be a necessary conflict between modern thought and the Biblical belief in revelation. All claims of revelation, modern science and philosophy seem agreed, must be repudiated, as mere relics of superstitious ages. When, with the beginning of modern times, religious belief was becoming more and more externalized as a lifeless convention, men of intellect were lifted by a new belief, their great belief in an autonomous philosophy and science.

The essence of modernity can be seen in humanity's freeing itself from the bonds of Middle Ages Certainly the modern age has, as a consequence of the liberation of humanity, introduced subjectivism and indivisualism. For up to Descartes The claim [of a self-supported, unshakable foundation of truth, in the sense of certainty] originates in that emancipation of man in which he frees himself from obligation to Christian revelational truth and Church doctrine to a legislating for himself that takes its stand upon itself.

Both men [Rahner and Balthasar] were deeply concerned with apologetics, with the question of how to present Christianity in a world which is no longer well-disposed towards it. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. For the French film, see Modern Life film. For the British film production company, see Modern Life? Age of the human race Recorded history. Earliest records Protohistory Proto-writing. Bronze age Iron age. Early antiquity Axial antiquity Late antiquity. Africa North America South America. Oceania East Asia South Asia. Southeast Asia West Asia. Africa Americas.

Oceania East Asia. South Asia. Early modern Late modern.

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Modernity Futurology. Main article: Secularity. Main article: Modern science. Main article: Modern art. Adorno, Theodor W. Negative Dialectics , translated by E. Originally published as Negative Dialektik , Frankfurt a. Schwab and Walter. Alexander, Franz. Journal of the American Medical Association 96, no. Reprinted in Mental Hygiene 16 : 63— New York: Basic Books, Bacon, Francis. London: J. Barker, Chris. Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice. London: Sage. Baudelaire , Charles. London: Phaidon Press. Bauman, Zygmunt. Modernity and the Holocaust.

Cambridge: Polity Press. Berman, Marshall. New York: Simon and Schuster. London: Verso. Paperback reprint New York: Viking Penguin, London and Brooklyn: Verso. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Machiavelli and Republicanism. Ideas in Context. Cassirer, Ernst. Chapter 1. Milford, Oxford University Press. Calinescu, Matei. Durham: Duke University Press. Call, Lewis. Postmodern Anarchism.

Malden, Mass. Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities , 2 vols. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Fackenheim, Emil L.

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Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation. Foucault, Michel. Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison. London: Penguin Books, Ltd. American edition, New York: Pantheon Books, Modernus und andere Zeitbegriffe des Mittelalters. Giddens, Anthony. Stanford, Calif. Goldwin, Robert. Hall, Christopher A. Harriss, John. Capitalism at the End of the Twentieth Century. Hartmann, Wilfried. Jahrhundert ". Miscellanea Mediaevalia 9. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. Henry, John. Lewis Amherst Selby Bigg. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Husserl, Edmund. Paris: A. James, Paul. Melbourne: Arena Publications. Kennington, Richard. Lanham, Md. Kilby, Karen. Oakes and David Moss, — Kompridis, Nikolas. In Philosophical Romanticism , edited by Nikolas Kompridis, 32— Laughey, Dan. Key Themes in Media Theory. New York: University Open Press. Leppert, Richard. Mandeville, Bernard.

London: Printed for J. Edinburgh: Printed for W. Gray and W. Peter, Mansfield, Harvey. Taming the Prince. The Johns Hopkins University Press. O'Donnell, James J. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. Orwin, Clifford, and Nathan Tarcov. The Legacy of Rousseau. Osborne, Peter. Essex Symposia, Literature, Politics, Theory.

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Manchester: Manchester University Press. Pius IX Papal Encyclicals Online. Retrieved 25 September Pius X. Vatican website accessed 25 September Pius X. Papal Encyclicals Online accessed 25 September